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VOLUME XVI WINTER, 1956 NUMBER 1
SYMPOSIUM: RADAR SPEEDMETERS*
PAW I
THE SCIENTIFIC RELIABILITY OF
RADAR SPEEDMETERS
DR. JOHN M. Kopmmt
INTRODUcriON
The increasing use of radar speedmeters for the appre-
hension of drivers who exceed the speed limits on our
streets and highways is cause for inquiry as to the mode of
operation, accuracy, and reliability of this new method of
measuring the speed of a moving object. How does the
radar method work, what technical problems arise in the
use of this equipment, and what operational procedures are
recommended in using the radar speedmeter? In trying to
answer these questions we shall begin with a brief discus-
sion of the problem of making a measurement of speed, then
show how speed may be measured by application of the
principles used in the radar speedmeter, next take up the
matters of over-all accuracy and reliability of the meter,
and finally discuss the operational use of the meter.
* The two articles appearing under this heading were prepared originally
for publication in The North Carolina Law Review and appeared in 33
N. C. L. Rev. 343 (1954). They are reprinted here with permission of that
Review and the authors (with minor editorial changes by Dr. Kopper of
his article), as being of particular and timely interest to those of our sub-
scribers who do not take that Review.
t Research Scientist in the Radiation Laboratory, The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, and on the Staff since 1937; Bachelor of Engineering, 1933, Doctor
of Engineering, 1944, both in Electrical Engineering, The Johns Hopkins
University; Registered Professional Engineer, State of Maryland; profes-
sional experience includes work with the National Advisory Committee for
aeronautics, Langley Field, Va., and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
Pittsburgh, Pa., and also appearances as expert witness on radar speed-
meters in New York, New Jersey, and Tennessee.
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THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
The problem is to measure the speed of a vehicle moving
with respect to a stationary observer. The making of any
measurement requires that there be a standard of refer-
ence, a means of comparing the quantity to be measured
with this standard of reference, and an observer. How
accurately the comparison is made depends upon the means
of measurement and the care and judgment of the observer.
For example, if we try to measure the length of a fifty-foot
stone wall with a linen tape we find that on dry days the
length as measured by the tape is slightly less than it is on
damp days, when the tape may have shrunk. On the other
hand, if we measure the length of the wall with a steel tape,
whose length will change only a negligible amount with
variations of temperature and not at all with changes of
humidity, we have a more accurate measure of the length
of the wall. As another example, the accuracy of measure-
ment of an interval of time depends upon the kind of clock
used and upon the care of the observer in starting and
stopping the clock at the right instants. Similarly, the ac-
curacy of measurement of the speed of a vehicle on the
highway by means of a speedometer in another vehicle de-
pends upon how accurately the speedometer has been
checked and upon how carefully the patrolman can main-
tain a constant, safe distance behind the speeding vehicle
while he reads the speedometer. The method of measuring
speed with a speedometer is a method accepted by the
courts. The acceptance of this method is based on two
premises:
(1) That the speedometer is accurate, and
(2) That the patrolman knows how to make the mea-
surement.
Hence, in the method of measuring speed by radar the only
scientific questions that arise are:
(1) How accurate is the method, and
(2) Does the observer know how to make the measure-
ment with the radar speedmeter?
Accordingly, let us examine the principles of method.
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PRINCIPLES OF THE RADAR METHOD
The word RADAR is made up from the capitalized let-
ters in the set of words, RAdio Detection And Ranging.
Thus, a radar method is one that may be used to detect the
presence of a target and determine the distance of that tar-
get from the radar set. Radar methods can also be used to
obtain information on the bearing of a target, its altitude,
and speed. In all the methods electromagnetic energy in
the form of radio waves is radiated from the antenna of the
transmitter of the radar set so as to "illuminate" the target;
when the target is thus illuminated, it reflects a certain
portion of the energy back to the receiver of the radar set.
Searching the sky for a target by means of a radar set is
like scanning the sky at night with a searchlight. If a part
of the light sent out by the searchlight comes back to our
eyes, we say that something in the sky is reflecting the light,
and we deduce from this fact that in the sky there is a cloud
or airplane acting as a reflector. All this is a roundabout
way of saying that we see a target. In a similar way a radar
set is said to "see" a target.
There are several different types of radar systems, all
well described in books.' Some of the types are quite com-
plex, providing a lot of information about the target; other
types are simpler, giving less information. An example of
the complex type of radar is the pulse radar set, which sends
out pulses of radio waves and measures the time it takes
for the pulses to go to the target and come back to the re-
ceiver. As the pulses travel at the speed of light, you can
find out how far away the target is by multiplying the speed
of light by one-half the time elapsing between transmission
of a pulse and the reception of its echo. Here, an accurate
method of measuring time in millionths of a second has to
be incorporated into the radar set. Such a radar method
can also give information on the bearing of a target and its
angle of elevation in the same manner that a searchlight
IRIDENOUR, RADAR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, C. 5 (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1947) ; M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory Serie8, No. 1; HALL,
RADAR AIDS TO NAVIGATION 105-110 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.,
1946) ; M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory Serie8, No. 2.
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beam can, because all you have to know are the bearing and
elevation of the radar beam.
In contrast to the complexity of the pulse radar method
is the simplicity of the method that is used in radar speed-
meters. With the speedmeter the radio waves do not move
as short disconnected pulses, or groups of wave crests.
Instead, the radio wave crests move out from the trans-
mitting antenna continuously without break, and the num-
ber of them leaving the antenna each second is constant.
The number of these wave crests leaving during each
second is called the "frequency" of the radar transmitter.
For an average radio broadcasting station the frequency
of the main, or carrier, wave that brings music and the
sound of voices into our radio receivers at home is about
one million wave crests per second. For the radar speed-
meter made by a well-known manufacturer the frequency
is 2455 million wave crests per second. In scientific work
our viewpoint with respect to wave motion is slightly dif-
ferent. Instead of thinking of the number of wave crests
passing a point, we think rather of the total motion executed
by a little particle as it goes up and down from trough to
crest of the wave and back again, and we refer to this com-
plete periodic motion as a cycle of events for the little
particle. Accordingly we speak then in terms of cycles per
second rather than wave crests per second. Thus the fre-
quencies of the broadcasting station and the speedmeter are,
respectively, one megacycle per second and 2455 megacycles
per second, where a megacycle is equal to one million cycles.
This beam of radio waves that is leaving the transmitter
of the speedmeter at constant frequency can be directed
upon any object in the same way that the beam of a search-
light may be directed upon an object we wish to see. When
this beam of radio waves strikes an object, part of the beam
may be reflected back toward the receiver part of the speed-
meter. If the object is stationary with respect to the radar
speedmeter, then the frequency of the "echo" returned by
the object to the receiver is exactly the same as the fre-
quency of the beam of radio waves sent out by the transmit-
ter. But if the object is moving with respect to the transmit-
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ter, then the frequency of the echo will be different from the
frequency of the transmitted beam. If the object - in this
case a vehicle - is moving toward the speedmeter, then the
frequency of the echo will be greater than that of the trans-
mitter; and if the object is receding from the speedmeter,
the frequency of the echo will be less than that of the trans-
mitter. The change of frequency that occurs when the re-
flecting object is moving with respect to a source of constant
frequency is an aspect of an effect that Christian Johann
Doppler (1803-1853), an Austrian physicist, called attention
to in 1842. The Doppler effect has long been used for mea-
suring the velocity of stars with respect to the earth, light
waves being of the same nature as radio waves, but of fre-
quencies of the order of 500 million megacycles per second.
More recently the effect has been used to measure the speed
of airplanes2 and even the height of an airplane above the
ground.8 Indeed, the Doppler effect can be noticed for all
kinds of motion of a wave-like nature, as for example, sound
waves. We have all observed that when we drive past a car
whose horn is blowing, the pitch, or frequency, of the sound
of the horn falls suddenly just as we pass the car. As we
go toward the horn the pitch appears to us to be higher than
it actually is, and as we go away from the horn the pitch
seems to be lower than it actually is. The same effect would
be noticed if we were to remain stationary and the blowing
horn were to move. Thus, the Doppler effect is an apparent
change in the frequency of a vibration occurring when there
is relative motion between the source of the vibration and
the receiver of the vibration.
THE USE OF THE DOPPLER EFFECT
FOR MEASURING SPEED
Let us suppose that an automobile is moving along the
road toward a radar speedmeter from whose antenna radio
waves are being emitted at the rate of 2455 million wave
2HALL, RADAR ADs TO NAVIGATION 105-110 (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1946) ; M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory Series, No. 2.8 CHANCE, HULSIZER, MACNICHOL, AND WILLIAMS, ELECTRONIC TIME MEA-
SUREMENTS (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1947) ; M.I.T. Radia-
tion Laboratory Series, No. 20.
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crests per second. If the car were standing still it would
receive 2455 million wave crests per second, but since it is
moving it runs into some wave crests in one second that it
would not have met until the next second had it been stand-
ing still. Hence, to the car the frequency of the transmitter
seems to be slightly greater than 2455 megacycles per
second. Because it is reflecting these wave crests back to-
ward the receiver of the radar speedmeter the car becomes
a moving source of waves of this slightly higher frequency.
Since the car is now a moving source, the wave crest re-
flected at the end of a given second does not have to travel
so far to the speedmeter as the wave crest reflected at the
beginning of the second. The consequence is an apparent
further increase in the frequency already slightly greater
than 2455 megacycles per second. The result of these two
increases in frequency can be expressed by a very simple,
ideal formula as follows:
FR- ~ FT, (1)
where FR = the frequency of the radio waves received by the
speedmeter receiver after reflection from the car
FT = the frequency of the speedmeter transmitter
c = velocity of the radio waves
v = velocity of the car.
At first thought it would seem to be extremely difficult
to measure the value of either FR or FT down to the last
cycles per second in a number that already amounts to 2455
million cycles per second. Fortunately, however, there is
another phenomenon, the use of which renders the task
quite easy. This is the phenomenon of "beats", used by
players of stringed musical instruments for tuning their
instruments. If, for example, two adjacent keys on a piano
are struck simultaneously, the combination of the two tones
will have alternate increases and decreases in intensity, the
throbbing of the sound being called "beats". The number
of beats per second is equal to the difference of the frequen-
cies of the two vibrating sources. In the same way that
[VOL. XVI
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beats occur with sound waves of different frequencies so
can they also occur with radio waves or light waves of
different frequencies.
In the case of the radar speedmeter the antenna will
receive radio waves of two different frequencies. It will
receive part of the energy of the radio waves being emitted
by the transmitter at the frequency FT, and it will receive
part of the energy of the waves of frequency FR reflected
from the moving car. The beat frequency for these two
waves will be FR - FT. Let us see the result of subtracting
FT from FR, making use of formula (1).
F -F -c+v F-F
Fa-FT= FT -FTC-V
C + V FT -C FT
_cv F- - FTC -- 'I C -- C
FR- FT 2v FT. (2)C-v
For convenience let us denote FR - FT by FD, where the sub-
script D stands for difference or Doppler. Further, let us
observe that v, the velocity of the car, is very much less
than c, the velocity of radio waves. For a car going sixty
miles per hour, the value of v is one-sixtieth mile per
second, while the value of c is 186,281 miles per second.
Hence, we may drop the v from the denominator of the right
side of equation (2) because it is negligibly small compared
with c. Our modified formula is now
FD =- 2v FT (3)
C
and we see that for all practical purposes FD, the number of
beats per second between the transmitted and received
waves, is directly proportional to v, the velocity of the car.
A further manipulation gives
1 F,V=- 2F- C, (4)
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so that we now have the velocity of the car given directly
in terms of the beat frequency, the frequency of the trans-
mitter, and the velocity of radio waves. Let us use some
numbers in formula (4) to see the simplicity of the calcula-
tion. Suppose that FD is found by measurement to be 500
cycles per second, and suppose that the frequency of the
speedmeter transmitter is 2455 million cycles per second.
The speed of radio waves is known to be within one or two
miles per second of 186,281 miles per second; the speed in
miles per hour would be the speed in miles per second multi-
plied by the number of seconds in an hour, or 186,281 times
3600. The speed of the car will then be given as follows:
1 500
v x 5 00 x 186,281 x 3600 = 68.3 miles per hour.2 2,455,000,000x
Table I shows values of speed of a vehicle corresponding to
various values of the number of beats per second as counted
by the speedmeter.
Table I
FD v
(beats per second) (miles per hour)
1 0.14
10 1.37
100 13.7
200 27.3
300 41.0
400 54.6
500 68.3
600 82.0
A calculation made by letting v equal one mile per hour in
equation (3) will show that there will be 7.31 beats for
each mile per hour of speed of the vehicle, so that for a car
going sixty miles per hour, the beat frequency will be 438.6
cycles per second.
From the foregoing it is clear that the speed of an on-
coming vehicle may be measured by use of the Doppler
effect provided that there is a way of counting the beats.
Hence, we come to a brief description of how the beat fre-
quency is measured, after which we will be in a position to
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discuss the answers to the questions on accuracy of method
and knowledge required by the observer to make the
measurement.
MEASUREMIENT OF THE BEAT FREQUENCY
The receiving antenna of the speedmeter receives radio
waves of frequency FR reflected from the moving vehicle,
and it also receives a part of the radio waves of frequency
Fr emitted by the transmitting antenna. The combination
of the waves of the two different frequencies produces in
the antenna a small current of high frequency and of an
amplitude that varies comparatively slowly, that is, at the
beat frequency. This small current passes through a crystal
detector, producing a small voltage of the order of a few
thousandths of a volt varying in amplitude at the beat fre-
quency. This small voltage is then amplified about one hun-
dred times in a preamplifier. The output voltage of the pre-
amplifier is applied to a section of the electronic circuit that
further amplifies the beat wave and in addition transforms
the wave shape from a smooth type of variation, such as
characterizes the ripples on a pond, into a square type of
wave resembling the end-on view of a series of parallel
walls with vertical sides, all of equal width and each sepa-
rated from the next by a distance equal to the width. This
squared-off voltage wave now passes to an electronic fre-
quency meter,4 whose output voltage is applied to a vacuum
tube voltmeter. The reading of the vacuum tube voltmeter
may appear on either an ordinary indicating meter or an
ordinary recording meter. This voltage reading is a mea-
sure of the beat frequency and accordingly of the speed.
To make the final meter read in terms of miles per hours
it is necessary only to graduate a scale in such terms and
affix it to the meter. All sections of the entire beat fre-
quency meter - crystal detector, preamplifier, squarer, fre-
quency meter, vacuum tube voltmeter, indicating and re-
cording instruments - are made according to conventional
design procedure.
'ELMORE AND SANDS, ELEamONIcs 250 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., Inc., 1949).
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ACCURACY OF THE METHOD
In discussing the accuracy of any method of measure-
ment we attempt to state the tolerances involved in the
final result. For example, if we measure the length of a
fifty-foot wall quickly with a six-inch pocket rule the an-
swer we get might be in error by as much as six inches;
that is, the result might be 49.5 feet or 50.5 feet. The error,
then, is six inches in a length of 600 inches, which is
equivalent to one part in one hundred, or one per cent. If
the length of the wall is known to be fifty feet, then the
error in measurement, or tolerance, is one per cent. With
a steel tape the length of the wall can easily be measured
to within one-quarter inch, so that the error is now one-
quarter inch in 600 inches, or one part in 2400. We say that
we know the length of the wall to within about 0.04 per cent.
Hence, in assessing the accuracy of a method of measure-
ment we evaluate the tolerances in the individual parts
of the method, add them all together to see what the maxi-
mum possible tolerance is, and then claim that the method
can be used to make the measurement to within the toler-
ance found.
To find the tolerances for the radar speedmeter we begin
by considering equation (4),
-2FT (4)
The questions are how closely can FD be measured, how
closely is the frequency of the transmitter held at FT. and
how closely do we know the value of c. The value of c is
known to be within one or two miles per second of 186,281
miles per second, so that the tolerance in c is at the most
about two in 200,000, or 0.001 per cent. The frequency of the
transmitter can be set to within 0.05 per cent of 2455 mega-
cycles per second. The characteristics of the oscillating cir-
cuit of this transmitter are such that if its frequency were
to try to shift more than about 0.1 per cent, the circuit
would not oscillate. Hence, the tolerance for FT is very
small. With regard to the measurement of FD, small errors
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can result from changes in the voltage of the battery used
to supply electric power to the part of the system involving
the squarer, the frequency meter, and the vacuum tube
voltmeter. However, there are provisions for adjusting the
speedmeter to read correctly after it has been set up "on
location" so as to take account of changes of battery voltage.
The operator has merely to note from time to time whether
or not the pointer on the indicating or recording instrument
stands at zero when no vehicle is moving within the operat-
ing zone of the speedmeter. If the pointer does not stand at
zero he makes it do so by a simple mechanical adjustment.
A consideration of all possible changes in final reading of
the instrument due to changes in battery voltage leads to
the conclusion that the speedmeter will read speeds to with-
in two miles per hour. Compared with this, the one-thou-
sandth per cent tolerance in c and the one-tenth per cent
tolerance in FT, equivalent to 0.06 mile per hour for v equal
to 60 miles per hour, are negligible.
Another factor affecting the accuracy of measurement
has to do with the actual application of the instrument
rather than with technical aspects of the instrumentation.
Ideally, formula (1) is valid when the direction of motion
of the car is along the line of sight between the car and the
speedmeter. As such a condition is not usually possible,
there is an angle A between the direction of motion of the
car and the line of sight, so that the value of v is more
accurately given by formula (5) below,
=1 FD c2 Fr cosineA (5)
The magnitude of the cosine A term may be seen from the
following example. Assume that a car is 175 feet from the
speedmeter, that it is traveling along the center line of a
road 50 feet wide, and that the speedmeter is set up 10 feet
from the edge of the road. Then the factor, cosine A, will
be 0.98 for all practical purposes of calculation. If the speed-
meter reads 70 miles per hour, the true speed of the car is
71.4 miles per hour. In actual practice the meter is placed
closer to the road, but it will always read slightly less than
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the true speed unless it is directly in the path of the mov-
ing vehicle.
Certain additional technical questions arise as to the
accuracy of the method, some of them having to do with
the speedmeter itself, others having to do with the opera-
tional use of the method. For example, the meter should
be allowed to warm up for a period of five to ten minutes
before being put to work. The operating zone of the meter
covers a span of about 200 feet along the road, so that a car
may enter this zone at that distance and stay within the
view of the meter until it is almost abreast of it. After a
car enters the zone it takes the meter about one-fifth second
to respond. As regards possible zero shifts arising after the
meter has been properly set up and which have not been
adjusted out by the operator, the effect is additive. For
instance, if the pointer of the meter reads five miles per
hour with no car in its zone, and if then it reads 65 miles
per hour when a car passes through, the actual speed of
the car is 60 miles per hour. Diathermy apparatus in the
vicinity can give false readings, which would be noticed as
sudden jumps to say seven miles per hour at switching-on
of the diathermy machines, and sudden drops back to zero
at switching-off. While such effects can be zeroed out, their
intermittent nature more or less precludes the value of
doing this, and the operator would do well simply to note
when the effect is present or absent in making his speed
measurements.
An important feature of the speedmeter is that it will
read the higher of the speeds of two cars running simultane-
ously through the zone at different speeds. If two cars are
running abreast of each other at the same speed through
the zone the speedmeter cannot tell which car is being
observed, but its reading will be the speed of either of them.
It is then up to the operator to ascertain that the cars are
traveling abreast of each other. If one is passing the other
the speedmeter reads the higher of the two speeds. This
raises the question of what happens if a car is going through
the zone in the other direction. The meter reads the speeds
of both oncoming and receding vehicles with equal ac-
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curacy. However, a car traveling along the other side of
the road, going in a direction opposite to that of the cars
being observed, will be father away when it is in the operat-
ing zone of the meter than one in the lane being observed,
and will reflect back a much weaker signal than that com-
ing from an approaching car. The effect due to receding
cars can be largely eliminated by keeping the speedmeter
within about three feet of the edge of the road and by
pointing its beam more or less down the lane being ob-
served. On recording meters there is a difference between
the records of approaching and receding vehicles, when a
certain orientation of the speedmeter is used.
Swinging signs, swaying trees, and flying birds can give
momentary small readings of five to twenty miles per hour,
but the readings are of short duration and can be properly
interpreted; in any event their effect is not additive, owing
to the property of the meter that it reads the highest
velocity it observes.
As to aging of the parts, the general long-time effect
would be for the speedmeter to read less than actual values.
All in all, the cumulative effect due to decrease of battery
voltage during operation, the gradual wearing out of vac-
uum tubes, and the use of the meter at the side of the road
instead of in the direct path of a vehicle, is an indicated
speed that is less than the true speed by one or two miles
per hour.
The accuracy of the meter can be measured in the labor-
atory without recourse to any specialized equipment. As
was seen in equation (4) the meter is in essence a beat
frequency meter, whose readings are given in miles per
hour instead of in beats per second. Thus, any electronic
audio oscillator, whose frequency range has been properly
checked, can be used to check the readings of the speed-
meter. For example, when an alternating voltage of 500
cycles per second is applied at the proper points in the
meter, the indicator should read 68.3 miles per hour. How-
ever, as the speedmeter has a radio transmitter, its opera-
tion comes under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communi-
cation Commission, which requires that any person who
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does work on the transmitter possess a first or second class
commercial radio operator's license. In view of this require-
ment, all such checking of accuracy of the speedmeter is
best left in the hands of one legally qualified to do so.
OPERATIONAL USE OF THE METER
Having discussed the question of general accuracy of
the method, we come to the question of the knowledge re-
quired by the observer to use the instrument. In the opinion
of the author the average person engaged in traffic control
work can learn to use the radar speedmeter after about one
and one-half to two hours of instruction. He need not know
the details of design and construction any more than he
needs to know those of the speedometer on his patrol car.
It should be assumed that he has been provided with an in-
strument of sufficient accuracy; after that, proper and ade-
quate use of it depends upon his care and judgment.
Accordingly, from a scientific point of view, the author
recommends certain operational procedures as far as the
speedmeter and its use are concerned. Such procedures in-
clude the checking of the speedmeter before and after use
in each location, the keeping of records, and other details.
It is important to check the meter for accuracy each
time it is set up for use; if the meter is to be used at two
sites in one morning then it should be checked at each site
to avoid the contention that the meter was thrown out of
adjustment during transit. The meter should be checked
before the beginning of the period of observation of a high-
way and at the end of the period. In scientific work it is
usual to assume that if a given instrument reads correctly
at the beginning and ending of a set of measurements, its
readings during the interval were also correct. The check
can be made by having a car with calibrated speedometer
run through the zone of the meter twice, once at the speed
limit for the zone and once at a speed ten or fifteen miles
per hour greater. As the test car goes by the meter the
driver can notify the operator of the meter what his speed
is. If the difference between the speedometer reading and
the radar meter reading is more than two miles per hour,
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steps should be taken to see why this is the case and to
remedy the matter. Such a test naturally requires a periodic
checking of the speedometer of the test car. If such a pro-
cedure is carried out each time the radar meter is set up,
the check measurements made with the automobile speedo-
meter become supporting evidence.
It is highly advisable to record all pertinent information
regarding an observation at the time it is made because of
the difficulty of remembering details. It is therefore desir-
able to use a recording meter for speed measurements.
Good scientific procedure requires the following informa-
tion to appear on the recording chart: date and time of
starting a test; name of the operator of the meter; names
of other observers and their duties; number of the speed-
meter; number of the car in which the meter is installed;
the weather conditions. All of this can be written down in
less than a minute; its entry at the time of observation can
save hours of wrangling later. When it is decided that a
given car is to be apprehended the meter operator should
put a pencil mark beside the speed indication on the record-
ing chart paper as he watches the car go by, call out over
the radio telephone to his partners the speed, color, and
kind of car, some part of the license number if possible, and
then write on the chart paper this information and the time
and his initials. These notes should be corroborated by the
persons in the apprehending car by telephone so that all
details get completely entered. Thus, the speed indication
recorded on the chart will have permanently associated
with it the details essential in making the charge. Similar
information should be entered on the chart when check
runs are made. At the end of each day the chart record
for the day should be rolled up, have a tag affixed to it
bearing the date of the record, and be placed in a safe. A
log book should be kept to show the location, date, times
of beginning and ending of observation of traffic, names of
all patrolmen concerned, and the speed limit at the location.
Records should not be kept on scrap paper and then copied,
for errors may be made in copying. If errors are made in
writing down information, a line should be drawn through
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the incorrect parts, and corrections entered with a nota-
tion as to why they were made and by whom. It is recom-
mended that the operator of the meter and the people in
the apprehending car be within sight of each other so that
the operator of the meter can see the apprehended car and
signal ahead whether or not the right car has been stopped.
CONCLUSION
The Doppler effect has been used for approximately a
century for the determination of the speed of stars, and for
over a decade for measuring the speed of airplanes and find-
ing their height above the ground. Now this effect is being
used for the measurement of the speed of objects traveling
over the ground. The relation between the speed of an
object with respect to a radar speedmeter and the Doppler
beat frequency is direct. A speedmeter has been con-
structed with the use of a number of conventional electronic
sections so as to give a reading of speed within one or two
miles per hour of the actual speed. The value of the evi-
dence it can furnish will depend largely on how carefully
that evidence was correlated with other supporting evi-
dence at the time it was obtained.
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PART II
RADAR GOES TO COURT
HEmBERT R. Bm*
"RADAR AHEAD!" Automatically the motorist re-
leases the pressure on his accelerator. Rightly or wrongly
he has been advised that somewhere ahead there lurks a
scientific ogre manned by officers of the law and prepared
to condemn him to penal action should its super-human eye
detect a violation of the speed limit. However ignorant he
may be of the scientific processes which activate the mon-
ster reported to wait him, the average motorist pays re-
spect to its reputed powers to determine the speed of a
moving object more accurately than the human eye unaided
by electrical or mechanical contrivances. Nevertheless,
opposition to the use of evidence of speed gained through
radar equipment has been made both in and out of court.'
With the development of each scientific advance the
courts have been confronted with the problem of whether
* Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina School of Law.
'Radar evidence of speed was objected to for various reasons and with
varying results in the following cases which are listed in the order in which
they were decided: State v. Moffitt, 100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953)
People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953)
People of City of Rochester v. Torpey, 204 Misc. 1023, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 864(Monroe County Ct. 1953) ; People v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8(Ct. Spec. Sess. Yonkers 1954) ; People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N. Y. S.
2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. New Rochelle 1954) ; People of City of Buffalo v. Beck,
205 Misc. 757, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1954) and State v. Dantonio,
31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954). The details and rationale of these
cases will be discussed later in this article.
While much has appeared in the newspapers both for 'and against the use
of radar speed detectors and legislative halls have resounded to vocal sup-
port and attacks on the use of radar, the basis of objection seems to have
been not only the possibility of inaccuracy of the instrument or inept use by
its operator but the "unfairness" of the speed violator being caught by an
apparatus hidden from his view. Thus H. B. No. 183, introduced in the 1955
General Assembly of North Carolina, among other things provides that
officers operating speed checking devices on the highways do so in "full
view" of motorists.
It is not the purpose of the author to discuss the merits or demerits of
the hidden aspect of radar. See reference to this characteristic in State v.
Moffitt, supra. Suffice it to say that it seems to this writer that if it ap-
peared that someone was stealing chickens nightly from a hencoop the
best way to catch the culprit or culprits would not be to light up the hen-
coop and put an officer outside in full view, but would be to have an officer
in hiding to catch the thief when he thought the coast was clear for his
illegal operation. To place the officer in full view would most likely drive
the culprit to some other hencoop not so well protected.
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or not the story told by the scientific appartus or process
in question is to be presented to those who must ultimately
determine the fact. The problem before the courts is three-
fold: (1) Should the data as revealed by the scientific in-
strument or process be received in evidence; (2) as a pre-
requisite to its receipt must expert testimony be introduced
as to the theory, operation and accuracy of the device or
process in question; and (3) what weight or value is to be
according such data if received?
No one today would think of ruling out evidence offered
by even a lay witness that he weighed a certain article and
it weighed ten pounds. Being assured that the witness care-
fully read the scale the most that would be required would
be evidence that the scale was in accurate working order
and properly used for the purpose in question. Similarly,
a witness is without serious objection, or any objection
whatsoever, permitted to testify that at the time of a specific
event he observed the speedometer of the car in which he-
was riding and that it recorded a speed of fifty miles per
hour. In the average case opposing counsel would not call
for evidence that the speedometer was in accurate working
order. Why, then, should there be any question about the
admissibility of testimony by a police officer to the effect
that the reading of a radar speedmeter in his control and
in proper working order showed the speed of a given car
subject to observation by the radar device and the officer
to be so many miles per hour?
The answer would seem to be that radar is something
comparatively new, that its method of operation is not with-
in the understanding of the bulk of the people, that the
purported ability of radar to accurately determine the speed
of a moving object through unseen electrical impulses is
so far beyond the comprehension of the average person that
there is a reluctance to condemn on such evidence, and that
the radar process is such that error in the instrument or im-
proper handling by its operator could easily produce a false
testimonial conclusion. With variable degrees this same
sort of hesitancy to admit has evidenced itself in other in-
stances of scientific achievement.
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Thus, the use of fingerprints as a means of identification
has been recognized by our courts to have existed before
Christ,2 but it was only in 1905 that fingerprint evidence
was first introduced in an English trial.' In 1893, long be-
fore the fingerprint method of identification was in general
use by our police departments, Mark Twain in his novel
Pudd'nhead Wilson had attorney Wilson graphically de-
scribe the conclusive character of fingerprint identification
in his address to the court and jury.' Wilson's fingerprint
evidence acquitted his own clients and convicted Twain's
fictional personage Tom Driscoll, but the first actual con-
viction in the United States based on fingerprint identifica-
tion did not occur until 19061 and the first appellate court
decision in this country passing on the admissibility of fin-
gerprint evidence did not appear until 1911.6 Today no one
questions the admissibility of such evidence as a means of
identification merely because it is now generally, if not
universally, accepted that no two persons will have the
same fingerprint.7
I Stacy v. State, 49 Okla. Cr. 154, 157, 292 Pac. 885, 887 (1930), where the
court said, "From an examination of the authorities ... it appears that an
allusion to fingerprint impressions for the purpose of identification is re-
ferred to In writings as early as 650 A.D., and they are traced back to a
period some 100 years before Christ. Fingerprints were first used as a
manual seal to give authenticity to documents. . . . In conformity to de-
cisions of the courts in many states, we take judicial knowledge that there
are no two sets of fingerprints exactly alike."8 WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 280 (3d ed. 1937), where the
author refers 'to the trial of the Strattons as discussed in S. T. Felstead's
"Sir Robert Muir, a Memoir" at p. 186 (1927).
' TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON C. XXI, p. 192, "These marks [fingerprints]
are his signature, his physiological autograph, so to speak, and this auto-
graph cannot be counterfeited, nor can he disguise It or hide it away, nor
can it become illegible 'by the wear and mutations of time ... this signature
Is each man's own - there is no duplicate of it among the swarming popu-
lations of the globe! * * * Upon this haft [of the murder dagger] stands the
assassin's natal autograph, written In the blood of that helpless and un-
offending old man who loved you and whom you all loved. There is but one
man in the whole earth whose hand can duplicate that crimson sign."
5 See Laufer, History of Finger-Print System, ANNUAL REPORT, SMITH-
S0NIAN INSTITUTION 631 (1912). In this article the author shows that the
art of fingerprint identification was known in great antiquity by the Chinese
and brought over by them into India.
6People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 354, 96 N. E. 1077 (1911). In allowing the
fingerprint evidence the court recognized the case as one of first Impres-
sion in the appellate courts of the United States, but noted that such evi-
dence had been approved by the appellate courts of Great Britain, India
and certain European countries.
7See State v. Tew, 234 N. C. 612, 68 S. E. 2d 291 (1951). For a most in-
teresting article on the history and development of the art of fingerprinting
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In determining whether or not evidence of speed gained
through the use of the new scientific device of radar is to be
admitted, it behooves us to consider the philosophy which
has motivated the courts in allowing into evidence the re-
sults obtained through other scientific devices or processes.
The second appellate court decision in the United States
which sanctioned the use of fingerprint evidence was State
v. Cerciello.8 There the New Jersey court said:
"In principle its admission as legal evidence is based
upon the theory that the evolution in practical affairs
of life, whereby the progressive and scientific tenden-
cies of the age are manifest in every other department
of human endeavor, cannot be ignored in legal pro-
cedure, but that the law, in its efforts to enforce justice
by demonstrating a fact in issue, will allow evidence of
those scientific processes which are the work of edu-
cated and skillful men in their various departments,
and apply them to the demonstration of a fact, leaving
the weight and effect to be given to the effort and its
results entirely to the consideration of the jury. ''sa
That the law shall keep pace with science is in short the
philosophy expressed by the New Jersey court. No one
would deny that principle. But if the alleged scientific de-
vice or process is still in the experimental and unproved
stage, the law with its inherent conservatism will reject
the evidence. What is experimental and unproved today
becomes demonstrable and a fact tomorrow. What was
asserted by a minority yesterday is proclaimed by the
majority today.
If the development of the scientific instrument or pro-
cess has not yet reached the stage that it is either generally
or universally accepted as reliable in the particular field
to which it belongs, it is necessary that expert testimony
be introduced which will assert its reliability before the
ultimate results shown by the instrument or process will
see Poison, Fingerprints and Fingerprinting, 41 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
495, 690 (1950-51). For an earlier article describing the science of finger-
printing and the gradual acceptance of fingerprint identification evidence
by appellate courts see Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, Finger-
Prints and Palm-Prints, 25 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 500 (1934-35).
886 N. J. L. 309, 90 Atl. 1112 (1914).
Id. at 314, 90 Atl. at 1114.
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be admitted in evidence. At this stage of the development
of the scientific device or process it is readily conceivable
that contrary expert evidence will be offered which will
assert the unreliability of the scientific instrument or pro-
cess in question. The mere fact that there is this contradic-
tion in the expert opinion on the subject does not in itself
mean that the evidence shall not go to the jury. As in every
other instance of dispute on the facts the jury will be asked
to pass upon the validity of the expert testimony. Thus in
McKay v. State,' which involved a prosecution for driving
while intoxicated, an expert called by the state testified
that in his opinion the Harger breath test for determining
intoxication was accurate and reliable. He admitted that
there were others who disagreed with the accuracy of the
test. In sustaining the admission of the expert's testimony
the court said:
"Dr. Beerstecher testified that the instrument in
question is accurate and he gave his reasons for it. He
admitted that there are others who disagree with its
accuracy. The objection to his testimony, therefore,
goes to its weight and not to its admissibility. ' 'oa
On motion for rehearing the court further said:
"It is shown that some of the states use this Harger
test while others do not; that some scientists refuse its
recognition while others accept it as reliable .... [W]e
think that the reluctance of the jurisprudence of some
of the states to accept such a conclusion based on
that test goes to the weight thereof rather than its
admissibility.' ' b
If the scientific device or process is in fact reliable, it
eventually passes through the period of doubt and conflict-
ing expert opinion and reaches the point of general, if not
universal acceptance by those learned in the field. It may
go still further and be accepted as reliable not only by those
learned in the field but by the public in general. The most
frequently asserted principle is that before the court should
admit into evidence the results shown by the scientific
155 Tex. Cr. R. 416, 235 S. W. 2d 173 (1950).
Id. at 421, 235 S. W. at 175.
9b 155 Tex. Cr. R. 416, 422, 235 S. W. 2d 173, 176 (1950).
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device or process in question, it must appear that the said
device or process has gained "general acceptance" in its
particular field. Thus in Frye v. United States'° the court
said:
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs."" (Italics supplied.)
If in this day of rapidly advancing scientific progress the
courts are to keep pace with science, they must take judicial
notice of that which is generally accepted as true by those
learned in the scientific fields in question. They cannot wait
until every single individual acquiesces in the scientific
truths acknowledged by those skilled in the particular
science. How can the judge know what the status of accept-
ance of a scientific device or process is among those learned
in the field? Of course he can take expert testimony in
each case and inquire from the experts as to the acceptance
of the device or process. 2 He might resort to the encyclo-
pedia and scientific treatises on the subject. 3 He might
10293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir., 1923).
" Id. at 1014.
12 When the expert is produced, he may explain the device or process and
certify ,to its general acceptance for reliability by those skilled in the science,
or he may, without explaining the operation of the device or theory of the
technique, certify that it is generally recognized as accurate and reliable
by those learned in the field.
m It Is a well established principle of the doctrine of judicial notice that
the matter in question need not be such common knowledge that it is known
by the public in general. Nor need it be within the actual knowledge of the
judge. The court may inform itself of 'the facts, theories and conclusions
which have come to be established and accepted by the specialists in the
areas of the scientific knowledge in question. To inform itself the court
may refer to encyclopedias and scientific treatises or pamphlets and other
sources which can be deemed authoritative. See Dwinnell-Wright Co. v.
National Fruit Product Co., 140 F. 2d 618 (lst Cir., 1944) and 9 WIGMORA,
EVIDENCE §256 (3d ed., 1940).
For the convenience of those wishing to inform themselves by reading a
scentific article on Radar Speedmeters there is published in this Law Review
at 343, supra, an article by Dr. John M. Kopper, a learned authority in
the field. Dr. Kopper received his doctorate degree in Electrical Engineer-
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attend some institute or be advised by a specially created
ministry of justice as to the present status of various scien-
tific discoveries. 4 He might simply be told by the legisla-
ture that it in its own wisdom requires he admit the evi-
dence. 5 But surely he cannot bury his head in the sand
and wait until the force of an aroused public opinion com-
pels him to see and acknowledge that which by then has
become the common knowledge of the street.
Today the use of photographs and x-rays is every day
court practice. It was not always so. Thus, in People v.
Jennings,' our first reported case sustaining fingerprint
evidence, the court said:
"When photography was first introduced it was seri-
ously questioned whether pictures thus created could
properly be introduced in evidence, but this method of
proof, as well as by means of x-rays and the microscope,
is now admitted without question."'' a
A reference to photography requires that we consider
the anomalous position of such evidence in the North Caro-
Ing from Johns Hopkins and is currently on the staff of that University.
For twelve years he taught electrical engineering both at the undergraduate
and graduate levels including courses on automatic control. He has for
years been and currently is engaged in electrical research and has on sev-
eral occasions appeared in court as an expert witness on the science and
nature of radar speedmeters. See, for example, People v. Katz, 205 Misc.
522, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (Ct. Spec. Sess. Yonkers 1954), People v. Sarver, 205
Misc. 523, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. New Rochelle 1954) and State
v. Dantonlo, 31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954), in which cases Dr.
Kopper's testimony was accepted by the court as establishing the accuracy
and reliability of the radar speedmeter. In the Sarver case the court said,
"On the evidence before the court, it conclusively appears that the radar
or electronic speedmeter is an accurate and reliable instrument for the mea-
surement of velocity", 205 Misc. 523, - 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9, 13.
"1 See Pound, A Ministry of Justice as a Means of Making Progress in
Medicine Available to Court and Legislatures, 10 U. OF CHIc. L. REv. 323
(194243). Dean Pound suggested such an agency as a means of keeping the
judicial profession abreast of medical science. Such institutions are avail-
able in European countries and are a means of keeping the judiciary in-
formed In various scientific fields. See McDermott, The Proof of Paternity
and the Progress of Science, 1 HowARD L. REV. 40 (1955).
1See, for example, N. C. GEN. STAT. §8-50.1 (1953) commented on in 27
N. C. L. REv. 456 (1949) where the North Carolina legislature in 1949 pro-
vided that in cases involving paternity the court shall under certain con-
ditions admit evidence of the result of blood grouping tests. The statute
makes no provision as to the weight to be given such evidence. Whether a
negative finding of paternity on the basis of blood tests would require the
setting aside of a verdict of paternity has not yet been decided in North
Carolina.
16252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077 (1911). And see the opinion of Chief Justice
Clark in Lupton v. Express Co., 169 N. C. 671, 86 S. E. 614 (1915).
"I People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 548, 96 N. E. 1077, 1082 (1911).
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lina courts. In most states the photograph or x-ray is ad-
mitted as substantive evidence - that is, as proof of the
fact to be established. In North Carolina the peculiar doc-
trine of not according photographs the standing of substan-
tive evidence, but restricting their use to explaining or
illustrating the testimony of the witness, runs into difficulty
when the court is confronted with x-ray evidence. The
theory of the North Carolina court in regard to photographs
is that the witness refers to the photograph merely to illus-
trate his testimony and to make it more clear to the jury.
The witness saw the object, the photo reveals a picture of
the object, the witness states it is an accurate representa-
tion and through its use illustrates his oral testimony. But,
the jury is admonished, the photograph is not to be con-
sidered substantive evidence.'7
What happens when the x-ray is used? 8  The witness
has not seen through the skin and flesh of the individual
17 See Hunt v. Wooten, 238 N. C. 42, 76 S. E. 2d 326 (1953) where the
North Carolina view is restated and cases are collected. See excellent article
by Gardner, The Camera Goe8 to Court, 24 N. C. L. Rsv. 233 (1946) in
which the North Carolina view of refusing to admit photographs as sub-
stantive evidence is criticized. See also McCotmKicK, EviDENcn 388 (1954)
where the learned author In referring to the North Carolina distinction
according photographs illustrative qualities but not substantive weight says,
"It is believed that this distinction Is groundless and that the photograph
as part of the descriptive testimony is just as much substantive evidence as
the testimony of a witness describing the features of a scene or object with-
out a photograph would be. It may be correctly described as both 'illustra-
tive' and 'substantive'."
It is worthy to note that while the courts are sometimes accused of
being slow to accept the benefit of new scientific inventions, unusual speed
in acceptance was shown in connection with the x-ray. The x-ray process
was discovered by Professor William Konrad Roentgen of Wurtsburg, Ger-
many in 1895. One year later x-rays photos were admitted in evidence In
this country in Smith v. Grant, tried in the District Court of Colorado, First
Division, on December 3, 1896. The opinion of Judge Lefevre, who sat as
trial judge in ruling on the admissibility of the x-ray photos, is reported in
29 CHICAo0 LDMGL Nsws 145, Issue of December 26, 1896. Certain portions
of this first ruling on the admissibility of x-rays are worthy of quotation.
After noting that the x-ray differs from the normal photograph in that no
one can certify that he saw what the x-ray shows, Judge Lefevre says:
"We... have been presented with a photograph taken by means of a
new scientific discovery, the same being acknowledged in the arts and
in science. It knocks for admission at the temple of learning and what
shall we do or say? Close fast the doors or open wide the portals? ...
The law is the acme of learning throughout the ages. It Is the essence
of reason, wisdom and experience. . . .We must not, however, hedge
ourselves round about with rule, precept and precedent until we can
advance no further. Our field must ever grow as trade, the arts and
science seek to enter in .... Let the courts throw open the door to all
well considered scientific discoveries. Modern science has made it pos-
sible to look beneath the tissues of the human body and has aided sur-
1956] SYMPOSIUM: RADAR SPEEDMETERS 25
to the bone beneath. It is not the eye of the witness that
has penetrated to those depths but the eye of the x-ray.
That instrument has revealed on the x-ray plate the break
in the bone not discernible to the human eye. The doctor
takes the stand, he testifies to the broken bone, not as he saw
it, but as seen by the x-ray.19 The physician is unable [to]
say, "I saw the broken bone as this x-ray illustrates", which
is what the witness does when using the ordinary photo-
graph. Instead he says, "I did not and could not see the
bone to tell whether or not it was broken. But this x-ray
photograph shows the bone is broken." Clearly the x-ray
is being used as substantive evidence, and instead of the
x-ray photo explaining and making clear the testimony of
the witness to the jury as in the ordinary photograph case,
the physician is explaining and making clear to the jury
the significance of the x-ray itself. The position of the sub-
stantive and the explanatory is reversed.
In Spivey v. Newman," the North Carolina court said:
"Expert evidence as to what a duly authenticated
x-ray picture shows is undoubtedly admissible where
it tends to aid the jury to understand the nature and
extent of injuries involved in the action on trial."
Perhaps a realization by the court that necessity has
compelled it to permit the use of x-rays as substantive evi-
gery in telling of the hidden mysteries. We believe it to be our duty
in this case to be the first, if you please to so consider it, in admitting
in evidence a process known and acknowledged as a determinate
science. The [x-ray] exhibits will be admitted as evidence."
While the x-ray picture itself must, of course, be authenticated, Spivey
v. Newman, 232 N. C. 281, 59 S. E. 2d 844 (1950), it is no longer necessary
for a witness to testify to the reliability and trustworthiness of the x-ray
process as such. Thus in Call v. City of Burley, 57 Idaho 58, 73, 62 P. 2d 101,
107 (1936), the court said:
"The science of X-ray skiagraphy is too well founded and generally
recognized to render it any longer necessary for a witness to testify to
the reliability and trustworthiness of X-ray skiagrams as such before
admitting them in evidence."
See to similar effect Lupton v. Southern Express Co., 169 N. C. 671, 86
S. E. 614 (1915) and 3 WiGmop, EvIDENcE §795 (3d ed., 1940). See also
Scott, X-ray Pictures as Evidence, 44 MicH. L. Rxv. 772 (1946).
19 With his usual aptness for Biblical quotation, Justice Clarkson in Eaker
v. International Shoe Co., 199 N. C. 379, 386, 154 S. E. 667, 671 (1930), illus-
trated the characteristic of the x-ray by saying, "The x-ray pictures are
not like the man that looks in a glass. . . . 'For he beholdeth himself, and
goeth his way, and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was.'
James 1:23, 24."
2232 N. C. 281, 285, 59 S. E. 2d 844, 847 (1950).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
dence to be explained by the witness, may some day lead to
the abandonment of the "for illustrative purposes only rule"
applied to other photographs."
The importance of a consideration of the evidential value
of x-rays in relation to radar is readily apparent. The x-ray
through the use of electrical waves or impulses has revealed
the broken bone, the imbedded bullet, etc., which the physi-
cian could not see. The radar through the use of radio
waves has revealed the speed of an object which the un-
aided human eye and brain could not determine with any
degree of accuracy. The lines and shadows on the x-ray
plate disclose the broken bone or bullet; the calibrated
needle or the permanent graph of the radar speedmeter
reveals the speed of the passing car.2 1a
Turning to another scientific development utilizing elec-
tric waves, we might mention the electro-encephalogram.
Since its development in the late nineteen twenties and
early thirties the electro-encephalogram has become well
recognized in the field of medicine as a reliable apparatus
for discovering the existence of brain injury. Through the
use of electrodes applied to various portions of the sub-
ject's cranium tracings are made. By proper interpretation
of the waves made by those tracings, brain injury can be
discovered.
Epilepsy is one of the conditions which can be discovered
by the use of the electro-encephalogram. In a British mur-
der trial in the early nineteen forties, the defense was inter-
posed that the killing was perpetrated while the accused
suffered an epileptic seizure. It was important to establish
the fact that the accused suffered from epilepsy. During his
2 There was a time, indeed, when the court Itself gave an Indication that
it was prepared to abandon the distinction. Thus in Simpson v. American
Oil Co., 219 N. C. 595, 600, 14 S. E. 2d 638, 640 (1941), the court said, "The
thin line between the substantive and auxiliary function of photographs in
this connection which this Court seems still, on occasion, to regard, was not
violated." And see STANSBURY, NoRTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE 53 (1946).
z' There are different types of radar speedmeters. On some there is a
calibrated dial, as found on the usual automobile speedometer, and as the
car passes through the radar beam the needle on the meter advances to a
point showing the maximum speed of the car. Other types not only have the
calibrated dial with the moving needle, but also have connected therewith
a graph machine which records in permanent form a graph of the speed of
the passing car. See detailed reference to this latter type of radar equip-
ment in State v. Dantonlo, 31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
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period of incarceration and surveillance following his arrest
he suffered no such seizure. But an electro-encephalogram
tracing was made of the individual which showed the ac-
cused was suffering from epilepsy. Upon this evidence
being introduced, the jury returned a verdict of "guilty
but insane".22
More recently an American court has held that the trial
judge must accept in evidence the testimony of a physician
interpreting the tracing of an electro-encephalogram. Thus
in State v. Shiren,2" the accused was being prosecuted in a
New Jersey court for driving while intoxicated. By way
of defense the accused claimed he was not intoxicated but
ill. In support of this position he offered the testimony of
a neurologist to the effect that he had made an electro-
encephalogram of the accused, and that the brain wave
pattern as shown by that instrument revealed the accused
was suffering from a disease of the brain. The trial court
refused to allow this evidence. In reversing, the appellate
court declared that the exclusion of the evidence of the
encephalogram tracings as interpreted by the neurologist
was a deprivation of substantial rights of the accused.
Not all scientific developments have received judicial
recognition. Most prominent in the field which has thus
far failed to meet with the approval of the courts is the
polygraph, or lie detector. Although accepted by some trial
judges rules of such tests have been systematically excluded
by the appellate courts in the absence of a consent stipula-
tion to their use.24 Efforts to introduce into evidence results
12 Middle Templar, From an Offlce Window, 20 CAN. B. R¢. 794, 798
(1942), where the author concludes by saying, "Thus the electro-encephalo-
graph may save a man from being hanged for a crime of which he was not
even conscious. The plea is accordingly put forward that the use of the
electro-encephalograph should be allowed at the public expense in serious
cases if the doctor certifies that there is a prima facie case for suspecting
epilepsy."
15 N. J. Super. 440, 83 A. 2d 620 (1951). In discussing the principle to
be applied to the admission of scientific evidence, the court quoted with
approval what had been said in the fingerprint case of State 'V. Cerciello as
found in the body of this article at note 8, supra.
11 Illustrative cases cited in chronological order: People v. Becker, 300
Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942) ; State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S. W. 2d
43 (1945) ; People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70 (1950)
and Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 45, 230 P. 2d 495 (1951). A dis-
cordant note is found in the concurring opinion of Justice Chappel in
Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N. W. 2d 593 (1949). The majority of the
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obtained by the use of hypnosis or so-called truth serums as
scopolamine and sodium pentothal have likewise met with
failure.2" Much has been written both for and against the
use of the results of polygraph lie detector tests as evidence
of veracity.2" However, it seems to be generally agreed,
even by the proponents of such evidence, that there is some
area of inaccuracy or indefiniteness in the polygram pat-
terns in from one to 25 per cent of the cases."'
It is not the purpose of the writer to argue the merits or
demerits of lie detector tests. It is sufficient at this point to
show that not all scientific developments are accepted by
the courts as sufficiently accurate to warrant their results
being introduced in evidence. Whether the courts choose
to reject such evidence on the theory that lie detectors have
not gained a sufficient reputation for accuracy by those
skilled in the science, or whether the courts exclude such
evidence because of possibility of creating jury prejudice,
is at this moment of no concern.2" Suffice it to say that re-
court was adverse to admitting results of lie detector tests in evidence,
but Justice Chappel thought this might be done in a proper case. Where
the state and accused stipulated to the taking of a lie detector test and the
Introduction in evidence of the results obtained, the ruling of the trial
court admitting such evidence offered on the part of the state was sustained
In People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P. 2d 937 (1948). For an
opinion of a trial court ruling in favor of admission even In the absence of
stipulation see People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (Queens
County Ct. 1938). For an excellent discussion of the theory of the poly-
graph, its reputed accuracy, and complete listing of cases in which the
appellate courts have passed on evidence obtained by lie detector tests up
to the year 1953 see, Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of
Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711 (1953). See also the symposium which fol.
lows Dean Wicker's article in the aforesaid Law Review, pp. 728 to 774.
Expert testimony as to the theory and accuracy of lie detector tests has not
led to the admission of the results of such tests. See Frye v. United States,
293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir., 1923) and State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246
N. W. 314 (1933). Also in this connection see the annotation to People v.
Becker, 8upra, in 139 A. L. R. 1174 (1942).
See Depres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. OF CH. L.
REv. 601 (1946-47) ; People v. McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 21
(1950) ; State v. Lindemuth, 56 N. M. 257, 243 P. 2d 325 (1952) and Orange
v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S. E. 2d 267 (1950).
2 See INBAu, LiE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (2d ed. 1948).
See also Wicker, supra, note 24; Streeter and Belli, The "Fourth Degree":
The Lie Detector, 5 VAND. L. Rnv. 549 (1951-52) ; and Reid, The Lie Deteo-
tor in Court, 4 DE PAuI_ L. Rv. 31 (1954).
See INRAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRMINAL INTERROGATION 77 (2d ed.
1948). Mr. Inbau points out that although accuracy is found in 75 per cent
of the cases, actual error is probably not present In more than 5 per cent,
but that the remaining 20 per cent are of such indefinite character that no
diagnosis can properly be made on the basis of the tracings.
2 See the capable analytical discussion In McCoRMIcK, EvIDENcE §174,
particularly at page 373 (1954).
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sults of lie detector tests are in general excluded whereas
results of blood tests,2 a urine analyses," fingerprints, °
ballistic tests,"' x-rays, 2 and electro-encephalograms" are
generally admitted.
In the light of this situation we may properly ask in
what category we are to place the results gained through
the use of radar. To the author the answer seems clear.
Radar falls in with the x-ray and related scientific develop-
ments. It deals with the physical fact of the defendant's
speed and not with his mental processes. Its task is not to
read the mind of the defendant, nor to explore whether or
not he is withholding what he knows to be true and declar-
ing that which he knows to be false. It is not concerned with
his state of mind but only with the physical speed of the
object he is driving.
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss all the
scientific devices and processes on whose evidentiary value
the courts have been called upon to rule. The literature is
abundant in the over-all field. 4 But rather it is thought
",Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine
Intoxication, 29 VA. L. Riv. 749 (1942-43) ; Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-
Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 IOWA L. REV.
191 (1939) ; and Rowell, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Scientific
Devices and Analyses, 5 U. or FLA. L. REV. 5 (1952). Several states have
enacted statutes which establish standards of proof. Thus the New York
statute provides, among other things, that fifteen hundredths of one per
centum or more by weight of alcohol in blood Is prima facie evidence that
the defendant was in an intoxicated condition. N. Y. VsxaicLE & TRAFFIC
LAW c. 71, §70(5). A bill incorporating these provisions of the New York
statute was introduced in the Senate of the North Carolina Legislature on
February 25, 1955. For a very descriptive, diagrammatic Illustration of
the effect of various percentages of alcohol in the blood, see the illustrations
in Lawrence v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. App. 2d 5, 127 P. 2d 631 (1942).
Case authority sanctioning the admission of evidence of blood tests to estab-
lish intoxication Is abundant. It will suffice to cite the recent decision of
State v. Willard, 241 N. C. 259, 84 S. E. 2d 899 (1954) to that effect.
"0 State v. Slater, 242 Iowa 958, 48 N. W. 2d 877 (1951) ; State v. Cash, 219
N. C. 818, 15 S. E. 2d 277 (1941) ; and Toms v. State, 239 P. 2d 812 (Okla.
Cr. 1952).
10 See note 7, supra.
WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §15r (3d ed. 1937) and Inbau,
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, Firearms Identification - Ballistics,
24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825 (1933-34).
8See note 18, supra.
"See notes 22 and 23, supra.
"See, for example, WIGmORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed.
1937) ; Rowell, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Scientific Devices and
Analyses, 5 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 5 (1952), also reprinted In 6 ARK. L. REV. 181
(1952) ; and Smith, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 10
U. or CHI. L. REv. 243 (1943).
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that a discussion of a few of the leading scientific discoveries
will illustrate the principles heretofore applied and illumi-
nate the path the courts should take and the pitfalls they
should avoid in passing on the admissibility of radar evi-
dence. We shall, accordingly, discuss but one more scientific
process, namely the blood grouping tests as a means to
establish non-paternity. We select this process both because
it illustrates what one writer has called the "cultural lag"3
of certain of our American courts, and because it raises most
acutely the third aspect of the problem, namely, what
weight is to be given to the fact established by the scientific
device or process once it has been admitted in evidence.
Modern blood grouping had its origin with the discovery
of human blood groups by Landsteiner in 1900.36 Further
discoveries in this area were made from time to time. The
gist of these is that by blood grouping tests made of the
mother, child and alleged father it may be affirmatively
shown that the accused male is not the father. The test
results will not exclude parentage in all cases. They will
never prove parentage. But in many instances the group-
ings will incontrovertibly establish the impossibility of
paternity of the child in question by the accused.
As early as 1924 German courts3 admitted results of
blood grouping tests as relevant evidence in paternity cases
and, after the discovery by Landsteiner and Levine in 192719
of the previously unrecognized M and N factors in human
blood, results of such tests were admitted in the high courts
of England and the leading continental countries." The
8Britt, Blood-grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural
Lag", 21 MINN. L. Rzv. 671 (1937).
w Ibid.
w, See explanation of the process in detail as found in Hooker and Boyd,
Blood Grouping as a Test of Non-Paternity, 25 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOOY
187 (1934-35) and as also found in Britt, supra, note 35.
88 McDermott, The Proof of Paternity and the Progress of Science, 1
HOWARD L. REV. 40 (1955).
8 Hooker and Boyd, supra, note 37.
,0 The appellate courts in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and
Italy had accepted the results of blood grouping tests in evidence before any
appellate court in this country did so. See Hooker and Boyd, supra, note 37.
In the first reported case in New York, Beuschel v. Manowitz, 151 Misc.
899, ... , 271 N. Y. Supp. 277, 281 (1934), the court quoted from an opinion
of the Supreme Italian Court of Cassation, in which that court said:
"As regards the reliability of the results obtained by this method the
latest studies and investigations show that though the determination
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courts of the United States were not as quick to grasp the
significance of blood grouping tests.
The first decision of a court of last resort in the United
States on the admissibility of such tests in paternity cases
was State v. Damm" rendered by the Supreme Court of
South Dakota in 1933. The accused requested that blood
grouping tests be made of himself, the mother (who inci-
dentally was his adopted daughter), and her child. A medi-
cal expert was called who testified to the ability of the tests
to establish non-paternity in certain cases. The trial court
had refused to order the blood grouping tests. In sustaining
the conviction below the Supreme Court said:
"It appears that evidence as to blood tests in pa-
ternity cases has been accepted in Continental coun-
tries. We can find no record of the question being
passed upon by any courts of last resort in the United
States.... [W]e think it insufficiently appears that the
validity of the proposed test meets with such generally
accepted recognition as a scientific fact among medical
men as to say that it constituted an abuse of discretion
for a court of justice to refuse to take cognizance there-
of, as would undoubtedly be the case if a court today
should refuse to take cognizance of the accepted scien-
tific fact that the fingerprints of no two individuals are
in all respects identical." (Italics supplied.) 42
Thus the first decision of a court of last resort in the
United States rejected what had for several years been
accepted by the leading tribunals of Europe. The subse-
quent history of State v. Damm is noteworthy. A rehear-
ing" was had in 1936 and then the same South Dakota
Supreme Court appears to have caught up with scientific
knowledge, for it said:
"We therefore say, without further elaboration or
discussion, that it is our considered opinion that the
of the blood groups affords no positive evidence for a declaration of
filiation in a given case, it does, on the other hand, furnish incontro-
vertible evidence for the exclusion of this relationship when the child's
blood group does not agree, according to a definite scheme, with that of
the supposed father."
"62 S. D. 123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933).
Id. at 132, 133, 252 N. W. at 11, 12.
," State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 266 N. W. 667 (1936).
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reliability of the blood test is definitely, and indeed
unanimously, established as a matter of expert scien-
tific opinion entertained by authorities in the field, and
we think the time has undoubtedly arrived when the
results of such tests, made by competent persons and
properly offered in evidence should be deemed admis-
sible in a court of justice whenever paternity is in
issue." (Italics supplied.)44
What German courts had accepted in 1924, what the
South Dakota Supreme Court had rejected as inadequately
established in 1933, becomes incontrovertible in 1936!"5
Shall we presume the conviction was reversed? No, let us
not be too hasty, for the South Dakota court continues and
says:
"Notwithstanding these views, however, we con-
tinue to believe that we were right in our former rul-
ing ... We are far from willing to say that it was error
for a trial judge in South Dakota at the time of the
trial of this case [1931] to fail or refuse to take judicial
notice of the reliability of blood grouping tests. ' '45a
In the years following the aforesaid decision on rehear-
ing of the South Dakota court, innumerable state courts
took judicial notice of the scientific value of blood grouping
tests to establish non-paternity, and evidence of such tests
was admitted in case after case. Here and there, however,
the light of scientific learning had not penetrated certain
judicial minds, and thus we find that as late as 1949 the
Supreme Court of Iowa in a bastardy proceeding referred
to blood grouping tests in the following language:
"In this case the record is devoid of any evidence
whatever showing general scientific recognition of the
value of these tests. [The court, however, cited and
presumably read the opinion on rehearing of the South
Dakota court in State v. Damm.] Nor was it shown that
at the present time the tests are of sufficient general
acceptance for general scientific recognition as to be a
matter of which the court would take judicial notice."46
"Id. at 312, 266 N. W. at 668.
"If this article will aid some court in avoiding the embarrassing position
in which the South Dakota court found itself in 1936, it will have served its
major purpose.
"I State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 318, 266 N. W. 667, 671 (1936).
"Dale v. Buckingham, 241 Iowa 40, 43, 40 N. W. 2d 45, 47 (1949).
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Partly to overcome such lapses of learning on the part
of the judiciary, and partly to avoid them, the legislatures
in many states have enacted statutes providing for blood
grouping tests in paternity cases and for the admission of
the results of those tests in evidence.47
While the passage of these statutes has paved the way
for the admission of the results of blood grouping tests they
have not disposed of the third aspect of the problem, i.e.,
what weight is to be given to test results which establish
non-paternity? If the blood grouping tests establish that
the accused could not have fathered the child in question,
shall we permit a jury verdict to the contrary to stand and
convict the defendant when the incontrovertible scientific
data shows he could not have been guilty? It is here that
our American courts are still at odds with one another.
Thus in 1946 in the much publicized bastardy case of
Berry v. Chaplin48 the California court permitted a verdict
of the jury finding paternity on the part of the defendant
Charles Chaplin to stand despite the fact that blood group-
4 See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §8-50.1 (1953), which provides:
"In the trial of any criminal action or proceedings in any court in
which the question of paternity arises, the court before whom the mat-
ter may be brought, upon motion of the defendant, shall direct and
order that the defendant, the mother and the child shall submit to a
blood grouping test; provided, that the court, in its discretion, may re-
quire the person requesting the blood grouping test to pay the cost
thereof. The results of such blood grouping tests shall be admitted in
evidence when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician or other
qualified person.
"In the trial of any civil action, the court before whom the matter
may be brought, upon motion of either party, shall direct and order
that the defendant, the plaintiff, the mother and the child shall submit
to a blood grouping test; provided, that the court, in its discretion may
require the person requesting the blood grouping test to pay the cost
thereof. The results of such blood grouping tests shall 'be admitted in
evidence when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician or other
duly qualified person."
874 Cal. App. 2d 652, ..., 169 P. 2d 442, 451 (1946). Note the following
language of the court: "The report and the evidence of the physicians were
not controverted by any scientific evidence but were before the jury to be
considered with all of the other evidence in the case. . . .But the blood
tests were not conclusive evidence. . . . When scientific testimony and evi-
dence as to facts conflict the jury or the trial court must determine the rela-
tive weight of the evidence."
In a later case, Hill v. Johnson, 102 Cal. App. 2d 94, 226 P. 2d 655 (1951),
the California court held it was error to admit the results of blood grouping
tests showing the husband was not the father since it was contrary to a
conclusive presumption of legitimacy where it was shown the husband had
access to his wife during the period of conception, citing CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoc. §1962(5) which provides for the conclusive presumption.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing tests indisputably showed the defendant could not have
been the father. Similarly an Ohio court49 held that blood
grouping tests which showed the alleged father could not
have been the parent were not entitled to conclusive weight,
but were only to be considered with other evidence in
the case.
More recently, however, the absolute injustice of con-
victing a man of bastardy in the face of evidence of properly
conducted blood grouping tests establishing non-paternity
has induced certain of our courts to set aside verdicts of
guilty. Thus in 1949, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 0
declared that a jury verdict of paternity could not be per-
mitted to stand when the evidence of blood grouping tests
which had been properly and accurately made established
that the defendant was not the father. To similar import is
a decision of a New York court5 in 1950 where Justice
Shientag remarked in his concurring opinion:
"The legislature has not thus far seen fit to make
conclusive the blood grouping test where definite ex-
clusion of paternity is established. Despite that, how-
ever, the courts may not ignore the universal scientific
opinion that such tests, resulting in exclusion, are, in
fact, conclusive on the issue of paternity. . . .Such
scientific exclusion should, assuming the test to have
been competently and accurately made, be accepted
as conclusive by the trial court, notwithstanding the
strength, as in this case, of the nonscientific testimony
to the contrary. ' 52 (Italics supplied.)
And thus we see our courts have travelled the complete
gamut. From the holding by the South Dakota court"3 in
1933 to the effect that results of blood grouping tests were
not entitled to be given consideration by the jury to estab-
10 State v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N. E. 2d 962 (1939). The results of
the blood grouping tests were admitted under a state statute which, like
that of North Carolina, made no provision for their conclusiveness.
5 0 Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A. 2d 670 (1949).
"Commissioner of Welfare v. Costonie, 277 App. Div. 90, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 804
(1st Dep't 1950). See also United States v. Shaughnessy, 123 F. Supp. 674,
676 (S. D. N. Y. 1954), where by way of dictum the court said: "Blood tests,
properly taken, can absolutely exclude the possibility of paternity in certain
cases." For further discussion of this aspect see McDermott, supra, note 38.
277 App. Div. 90, ... , 97 N. Y. S. 2d 804, 806 (1 st Dep't 1950).
5 Supra, note 41.
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lish lack of paternity, we arrive at the holding of the Maine'4
and New York" courts in 1949 and 1950 that not only are
the blood grouping tests to be considered but they are con-
clusive when they establish lack of paternity notwithstand-
ing a jury verdict to the contrary.
In the light of the foregoing discussion showing the re-
sponses of the courts as to the evidentiary value of various
scientific devices and processes, we shall now examine in
detail the few reported cases in which the courts have ruled
upon the admission of evidence of speed determined by a
radar speedmeter. Some of these are decisions of trial
judges and others are opinions of appellate courts. We shall
consider them in chronological order.
The first of the reported cases is State v. Moffitt.' 6 The
report consists of the charge given by a Delaware trial judge
in September 1953. The state had offered evidence of two
highway troopers to the effect that they had clocked the
speed of the defendant by means of a radar speedmeter
which showed defendant was driving 63 miles per hour in
a 50 mile per hour zone. The state also had produced an
expert witness who had testified in detail as to the con-
struction and operation of the speedmeter and who had also
advised of means for testing the accuracy of such meter.
The defendant made two objections relative to the radar
evidence of speed. First, he said that the radar speedmeter
had never been recognized as being a reliable instrument to
record speed of vehicles on the highway, and second, that
even if evidence of speed obtained through the use of the
meter were admitted it should not be held, standing alone,
to be conclusive evidence of the defendant's speed.
The trial judge overruled defendant's objections, ad-
mitted the evidence of speed as shown by the radar speed-
meter, and in charging the jury, said:
"Based upon the testimony of the expert, I con-
cluded that the evidence as to the accuracy of the speed
meter was admissible . . .subject, of course, to your
Supra, note 50.
Supra, note 51.
100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953).
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determination as to its accuracy in measuring the speed
of the defendant's vehicle under all the circumstances
of the present case."'5 7
Referring to the fact that the detection of the defen-
dant's speed had been made by highway troopers and not
by the radar speedmeter expert, the court said:
"The mere fact that the test in the present case was
made by a person not skilled in electronics is not of
sufficient import to render the speed meter inadmissible
in evidence.""8
As to the value of the radar speedmeter as a scientific
instrument to record speed, the court said:
"I conclude, therefore, that an electronic speed
meter of the make and kind used in the present case,
if found to be properly functioning and being operated
in a proper fashion, is a device that the jury may find
to be a correct recorder of speed .... It falls in the cate-
gory of recognized instruments used to determine the
speed of a moving vehicle, such as a speedometer."59
(Italics supplied.)
After further instructing the jury that they must be
satisfied the radar instrument was accurate as established
by tests reasonably near to the date in question, the court,
in relation to defendant's second objection, instructed the
jury that the evidence of violation of the speed limit as
shown by the radar speedmeter would, standing alone,
"furnish sufficient evidence for the conviction of the de-
fendant".60
The second reported case, which is the first decision of
an appellate court in this country on the radar speedmeter,
is the New York decision of People v. Offerman,6' rendered
in October 1953. The defendant had been convicted in the
City Court of Buffalo for violating the speed limit. The
trial had been without a jury. The trial judge had admitted
Id. at 779.
Ibid.
Ibid.
0 State v. Moffitt, 100 A. 2d 778, 780 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953).
"1204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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evidence given by officers making up a radar team to the
effect that the dial of the radar speedmeter showed the de-
fendant was traveling 41 miles per hour in a 30 mile an
hour zone. The sole evidence of speed was the reading on
the dial. No expert witness was called, as in the Moffitt 2
case, to testify to the construction, theory and accuracy
of the speedmeter. Instead, one officer testified that after
the radar instrument had been set up, a test car was run
through the beam and the speed as shown on the speed-
meter dial in his control was the same as reported to him
by the officer of the test car as shown by the speedometer
of that car. The officer in the test car also testified that as
his car went through the beam he noted the speed on his
speedometer and it agreed with the reading on the radar
speedmeter as reported to him by the officer in control of
the meter.
While no expert in electronics was produced, the state
did offer the testimony of a third police officer. The state
attempted to qualify him as an expert on radar speedmeters
but the trial judge ruled he was not an expert since he was
not an electronics engineer, had had no formal training in
radio or engineering but had merely installed the radar
equipment in the police cars. Thereupon, both sides moved
for an adjournment so that an expert could be produced,
but these motions were denied by the trial court. Instead,
he permitted the aforesaid officer who had not qualified as
an expert to testify as to the construction, operation and
accuracy of the radar device. The only other material in
the case relating to accuracy of the speedmeter was a state-
ment by the trial judge that he had himself made a test of
the device by running his own car through the beam of such
a meter and found that it was accurate "on the nose"."
Four aspects of the case are considered on appeal. First,
the court found that the trial judge committed error in per-
mitting the two officers making up the radar team to testify
that the speed as shown on their speedmeter, or speed-
2 Supra, note 56.
8 People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, ... , 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179, 184 (Sup.
Ct. 1953).
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ometer respectively, was the same as the speed shown on
their co-officer's meter as reported to them at the time of
the test. Clearly the court was correct in stating that the
officer in the test car could not testify to the speed shown
on the radar speedmeter as reported to him by the other
officer. And the converse is likewise true. However, this
element of hearsay, while declared error, was not said by
the court to be sufficient in itself to warrant a reversal.
Indeed, proper trial procedure would simply require that
each officer testify as to the speed shown on his respective
meter when the test was made and it is a simple process for
the jury to determine from the identical nature of this testi-
mony that the two instruments were recording the same
speed.
Secondly, the appellate court found that the trial court
abused its discretion when it failed to grant an adjourn-
ment so that the evidence of an expert could be obtained as
to the nature, operation and accuracy of a radar speed-
meter. Thirdly, the court held it was error for the trial
judge to permit the third officer who had not qualified as
an expert to testify as to the accuracy of the radar speed-
meter. Fourthly, the court found the statement made by
the trial judge as to his own test of the accuracy of the
radar speedmeter device to be objectionable, both because
it necessarily had to be founded on hearsay information as
to what had appeared on the speedmeter when he drove
his own car through the beam, and further because the
judge had taken into consideration his private knowledge
on a subject which "does not lie within the field of judicial
notice under the circumstances of this case as the operation
of this device is not a practical application of scientific facts
which are generally known or ought to be known". 4
Clearly, again, the court was correct in that the trial
judge could not know of the accuracy of the radar speed-
meter by making a personal test in driving his car through
the beam without accepting the hearsay statement of the
person in charge of the meter. However, the critical portion
of the court's opinion is that which declares the radar de-
"Ibid.
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vice does not lie within the field of judicial notice on the
ground that the operation of such device is not a practical
application of scientific tests which are generally known
or ought to be known. The court concluded its opinion by
referring to the New York Traffic Law,65 wherein the legis-
lature had provided that a certain percentage of alcohol
in the blood is prima facie proof of intoxication, and sug-
gested that perhaps some day in the future the legislature
may provide that the reading of speed as shown on a radar
speedmeter shall be considered prima facie the speed of the
vehicle in question:
"By such legislation the people will be relieved of
the burden of proving the accuracy of the electrical
time devise upon each trial and by expert testimony.
The traveling public will be protected against convic-
tions based upon the reading of an unproven and pos-
sibly inaccurate device and of equal importance the
rules of evidence will not be violated."66
From the above analysis of the decision of the first
appellate court passing on the radar speed meter, it is ap-
parent that the basic objection was the lack of expert testi-
mony in the trial court. It is clear, also, that the court was
of the opinion that as of the then date, in the absence of
legislation on the subject, expert evidence would have to
be introduced as to the accuracy of the operation of the
speedmeter before its results could be considered by the
court or jury.
People of the City of Rochester v. Torpey67 is the third
reported case on the radar speedmeter. It is a decision of
an inferior appellate court in New York rendered in De-
cember, 1953. The defendant had been convicted in the
City Court of Rochester of violating the speed laws. The
People introduced the testimony of police officers, who
had manned the radar unit and observed the defendant's
car passing, that in their opinion it was going 45 miles per
hour, and further introduced evidence to the effect that the
05 See note 28a, supra.
10 People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, ... , 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179, 185 (Sup.
Ct. 1953).
el 204 Misc. 1023, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 864 (Monroe County Ct. 1953).
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radar speed device which had been trained on the car in
question showed a reading of 43 miles per hour as the defen-
dant's speed. Either of those speeds was well above the
city speed limit. The court pointed out that the testimony
of the police officers' personal opinions as to speed was in
itself sufficient to convict the defendant, but it then went
on to discuss the admissibility of the evidence of the read-
ing on the radar speedmeter.
In this connection the court noted that no expert testi-
mony had been introduced as to the accuracy of radar for
the purpose of measuring speed. There had been evidence
by the police officers that they had tested the meter by
running a test car through the beam and by comparing the
readings on the speedometer and speedmeter. Also evi-
dence was introduced to show that the speedometer on the
test car had been tested and found in good working order.s1a
In the light of the personal opinion testimony of the officers,
plus the testimony aforesaid as to the reading on the radar
"I It will be noticed that the state in cases where it is using a radar
speedmeter invariably puts in evidence to the effect that -the speedmeter
was checked with the speedometer of a test car that was run through the
beam. Upon finding the two speed readings were the same, it is presumed
in some cases that the readings on the radar speedmeter were accurate.
In certain instances the state may go further and offer evidence showing
that the speedometer on the test car had recently been tested and been
found correct. Further than that the proof has not gone. But one may ask,
"What about the accuracy of the instruments, stop watch, or otherwise,
that were used in testing the accuracy of the speedometer in the test car.
And going back still further, what evidence is there of the accuracy of the
instruments or process used in checking the stop watch, that checked the
speedometer in the test car, that checked the radar speedmeter?" It is
apparent that at some point In the checking process the accuracy of the
instrument which Is the checking authority must be taken for granted, for
if not we would eventually be brought to the point of questioning the
accuracy of the steel tape or surveyor's device which measured off the test
mile area. In this connection, the English case of Nicholas v. Penny, [1950]
2 K. B. 466 (C. A.) also reported and annotated in 21 A. L. R. 2d 1193 is of
considerable interest. While the instrument used by the police in deter-
mining the accused's speed was not a radar speedmeter but the customary
speedometer found in automobiles, the court held that a conviction based
upon evidence of speed readings on the speedometer in the police car,
which followed the defendant's car at an even distance, would be sustained
even though there was no evidence of the accuracy of said speedometer,
since, in the absence of contravening evidence, the readings on the speed-
ometer in the police car would be deemed to be prima facie correct.
The author of the annotations to this case states that there apparently
are no American cases directly holding that evidence of measurements by
mechanical instruments will be presumed correct in the absence of any
evidence that the Instrument has been tested for accuracy within a rea-
sonable period. He accounts for this dearth of authority by noting that In
many American cases no objection was raised as to the accuracy of the
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speedmeter, the county court held there was sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the conviction of the defendant.
But the court took pains to point out that if the People's
sole evidence of speed on the part of the defendant was the
reading on the radar speedmeter, expert testimony would
be needed to establish the accuracy of such device. Particu-
larly the court said:
"The use of radar is compartively new as a means
of bringing about the arrest of violators of ordinances
pertaining to the speed of automobiles and until such
time as the courts recognize radar equipment as a
method of accurately measuring the speed of automo-
biles, in those cases in which the People rely solely
upon the speed indicator of the radar equipment, it will
be necessary to establish by expert testimony the ac-
curacy of radar for the purpose of measuring speed."
(Italics supplied.) 68
The fourth case in chronological sequence is People v.
Katz,69 a decision of a trial court in Yonkers, New York,
rendered in March, 1954. Testimony of police officers was
to the effect that one of them in charge of the operation of
the radar apparatus observed that when defendant's car
passed through the radar beam the recording dial on the
speedmeter showed the defendant was exceeding the speed
limit, and that this information was passed on to an officer
further down the highway who served the defendant with
a summons. In addition, the prosecution offered in evidence
the testimony of an electronics expert, Dr. John M. Kopper,
who testified in detail regarding the construction of the
radar speedmeter and fully explained its operation. He
also testified that the operator of the recording equipment
can tell when it is out of calibration, and may quite easily
determine when the machine is not working properly.
measuring instrument and that in the others proof of accuracy was sub-
mitted. In certain states statutes expressly provide that where a police
speedometer has been tested and certified as accurate as required by the
statute, no proof of its accuracy need be submitted. See Commonwealth v.
Parish, 138 Pa. Super. 593, 10 A. 2d 896 (1940).
8 People of City of Rochester v. Torpey, 204 Misc. 1023. 128 N. Y. S.
2d 864, 866 (Monroe County Ct. 1953).
205 Misc. 522, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (Ot. Spec. Sess. Yonkers 1954).
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At the end of the foregoing testimony the defendant
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the evidence
offered was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The reported decision is the court's ruling
on that motion. In denying the same the court referred to
People v. Offerman70 discussed, supra, and said:
"The objectionable and incompetent evidence which
warranted a reversal in that case is, in my opinion, not
present in the instant case.
"The Electromatic Speedometer herein described is
a scientifically reliable device which if properly oper-
ated and properly functioning falls in the category of
recognized instruments used to determine the speed of
moving vehicles." 71
Three weeks later, on March 31, 1954, the Court of
Special Sessions of New Rochelle, New York, decided
People v. Sarver.7 2 In support of the prosecution, evidence
of a permanent graph recording of the speed of defendant's
vehicle as made by the electromatic speedmeter was intro-
duced. In addition expert testimony of Dr. John M. Kopper,
the same electronics expert who had testified in the Katz8
case, and who is the author of the scientific article on radar
speedmeters appearing in this Law Review, was intro-
duced, which described in detail the construction and oper-
ation of the electronic speedmeter. Evidence was also ad-
mitted to the effect that the speedmeter was calibrated or
tested on the morning of the day of the alleged violation,
that it had been acquired six months before the day in
question, that it was manufactured by the Automatic Signal
Division of Eastern Industries, Inc., at Norwalk, Connecti-
cut, and that it had been frequently tested and found to be
accurate when compared with the conventional speedo-
meter. Although no special significance seems to have been
placed on the fact, the court points out that the officer in
charge of the radar apparatus held a United States Govern-
10 Supra, note 61.
7People v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, ... , 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8, 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
Yonkers 1954).
" 205 Misc. 523, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. New Rochelle 1954).
SSupra, note 69.
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ment Radio Telephone Operator's License, First Class, had
been a Chief Radioman in the Navy, and for two years
studied electrical engineering at New York University.
In its motion to dismiss, the defense relied on two
grounds: (1) that the defendant had not been properly
identified, and (2) that the radar speedmeter was inaccu-
rate and unreliable. As to the first contention the court
said:
"Defendant contends that Officer Rabbitt, who
directed the arrest [and who was in charge of the radar
speedmeter] could not identify the defendant. The tes-
timony showed that Officer Rabbitt saw a green truck
which approached and passed him at an excessive rate
of speed as recorded on the speedmeter's graph. This
information was passed on to Officer Burkhardt, who
arrested the driver of the green truck, who is the de-
fendant. The circumstances conclusively established
the defendant's identity. No further identification is
necessary." '74
In overruling the second objection of the defendant, the
court referred to People v. Offerman,75 discussed, supra, and
noted that the conviction in that case had been reversed
"because there was no competent evidence as to the ac-
curacy and reliability of the radar speedmeter. Such is not
the case here".76 Then the court found that the radar speed-
meter has found its place among those scientific instru-
ments accepted as reliable and accurate. It states:
"On the evidence before the Court, it conclusively
appears that the radar or electromatic speedmeter is an
accurate and reliable instrument for the measurement
of velocity. It must take its place along with the ordi-
nary mechanical speedometer as a device which accu-
rately measures the speed of a moving vehicle.... The
radar speedmeter is no different than any other scien-
tific device. Admissibility of tests made by it depends
entirely on its accuracy and reliability."'77 (Italics
supplied.)
" People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, ... , 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9, 11 (Ct. Spec. Bess.
New Rochelle 1954).
75 Supra, note 61.
" People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, .... 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9, 12 (Ct. Spec. Bess.
New Rochelle 1954).
77Id. at .. ., 12 N. Y. S. 2d at 13.
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People of the City of Buffalo v. Beck, 8 decided in April,
1954, is the next case in sequence. At the trial, which was
held without a jury in the Buffalo City Court, the prosecu-
tion offered the testimony of four policemen to the effect
that they had personally observed the defendant's car in
motion and were of the opinion it was travelling 40 miles
per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone. In addition the prose-
cution introduced evidence of the speed of defendant's car
as shown by the radar speedmeter. No expert evidence was
introduced as to the construction, operation or accuracy of
the meter. The trial judge, however, stated that he would
take judicial notice of the operation and accuracy of radar
devices to establish the speed of automobiles and found the
defendant guilty.
On appeal, the conviction was reversed by the New York
Supreme Court, Erie County, Justice Ward holding that the
trial judge had committed error in taking judicial notice of
the radar speedmeter as a device for accurately measuring
speed. As Justice Ward saw it the trial judge was a bit
premature.
It is doubtful if many of us understand the scientific
principles which are involved in the operation of the x-ray.
The writer also doubts that Justice Ward would reverse a
trial judge who took judicial notice of the reliability of the
x-ray as a means of revealing hidden bone injury. Yet,
Justice Ward seems to be of the opinion that before a judge
can take judicial notice of a radar speedmeter as an accurate
device for measuring speed, the public at large must under-
stand the mysteries of electronics and their particular appli-
cation to the operation of a radar speedmeter. Thus, in re-
versing the conviction below, he said:
"I must hold that the theory of the operation of this
electrically operated device and the accuracy of its
measurement of speed is not a proper subject for ju-
dicial notice at this time. Electronics is a recent de- *
velopment in the science embracing the mysteries of
electricity. ... Certainly it cannot be said that such
knowledge is 'notorious' as above desckibed or that it is
'the general knowledge of the country' nor is the opera-
19 205 Misc. 757, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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tion of this device 'a practical application of scien-
tific facts which are generally known or ought to be
known'." (Italics supplied.)"
Although the evidence of the four officers independent
of the radar evidence showed a violation, Justice Ward
ruled there had to be a reversal because he could not tell
whether the trial judge had relied on the officers' testimony
or on the radar evidence.
The next case in sequence and the last reported one as
of this writing on the radar speedmeter is State v. Dan-
tonio.80 It is a decision of a New Jersey criminal court hold-
ing a 'trial de novo following a conviction of the defendant
in an inferior municipal court. At the trial de novo expert
testimony of the same Dr. John M. Kopper heretofore men-
tioned was introduced relative to the operation and ac-
curacy of the radar speedmeter. In addition evidence of
state troopers was introduced to the effect that they had
duly set up the radar equipment, tested it by running a test
car through the beam, found it accurately calibrated and
proceeded to check oncoming traffic. The speeding charge
was predicated on a recording of the radar speedmeter and
graph machine connected therewith made as defendant's
truck passed through the beam. The defendant contended
that (1) the trial court permitted hearsay testimony to be
given by the officers in relation to tests made of the radar
device's accuracy, and that (2) the trial court permitted
testimony to be given concerning the accuracy of the radar
device by one who was not qualified as an expert.
It will be noted that the first objection as to hearsay is
the same objection the court discussed in People v. Offer-
man,81 supra. The court properly disposed of the objection
against the defendant in the Dantonio case by saying:
"Each officer testifies as to independent facts. The
,. patrol car officer testifies as a fact to the speed of the
patrol car as shown by his speedometer. The radar
operator testifies as to the recording of the electric
7I. at .. ., 130 N. Y. S. 2d at 357.
0 31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
61204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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speedmeter and the graph machine and of his own
visual observation of the car making the test. Radio
communication [between the test car and radar oper-
atori is merely incidental." 2
As to defendant's second contention, the court pointed
out that Dr. Kopper was an expert in electronic speed de-
vices and fully qualified. It also brought out the fact that
on Dr. Kopper's testimony given under cross examination,
it appeared that any defects in the radar equipment, such
as defective tubes, condensers or low voltage in the battery,
would all tend to decrease the number of electrons emitted
from the heat surfaces within the tubes and give a lower
and less than true reading. Thus, the court concluded, "All
defects in the equipment resolve in favor of the motorist."8
The court referred to the first case reported, State v.
Moffitt, 4 and said it was in full agreement with that portion
of the Moffitt case which stated that the mere fact the test
was made by a person not skilled in electronics is not of
sufficient import to render radar speedmeter evidence in-
admissible.
Reviewing the above cases on the radar speedmeter, we
find that in all seven of them the evidence of speed as shown
by the speedmeter was admitted in the trial court. An ex-
pert in electronics familiar with the theory and operation
of the radar speedmeter testified in four of the cases. 85 In
the two New York state superior appellate cases86 which
reversed the trial court, no such expert had testified. In
the one New York case87 in which a conviction was sus-
tained by an inferior appellate court, and in which no ex-
pert had testified, the court based its affirmance on the fact
that there was other evidence of speed in the case, but
admonished that if the radar evidence were the sole evi-
dence of speed, there would be a reversal.
From a consideration of all of the opinions it is clear
that the linchpin in the prosecution's case at the time of
a31 N. J. Super. 105, ... , 105 A. 2d 918,921 (1954).
ss Ibid.
100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953).
These are the Moffltt, Katz, Sarver and Dantonio cases.
These are the Off erman and Beck cases.
87 This is the Torpey case.
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these decisions was expert testimony as to the construction,
theory, operation and accuracy of the radar speedmeter.
Without the aid of expert evidence, certain of the courts
would not recognize the said speedmeter as an instrument
that accurately registers the velocity of a moving vehicle.
But it is apparent from the decisions of those courts that
had such expert evidence been introduced, the evidence of
the defendant's speed as shown by the speedmeter would
have been admitted. Thus the radar speedmeter has already
surpassed the lie detector in judicial recognition. 8 It is
equally apparent that even those overly cautious judges
who in their decisions found that expert testimony was a
prerequisite to the admission of the speedmeter's readings
did not mean to imply that such testimony would always be
essential. Thus, Justice Ward in the Beck case stated that
the radar speedmeter was not a "proper subject for judicial
notice at this time".,9
Some day those judges will say, "The time has now
come when we must take judicial notice of the radar speed-
meter without the assistance of expert testimony." And
then they will solemnly declare that the radar speedmeter
falls in the category of recognized instruments which accu-
rately determine the speed of moving vehicles, thus adopt-
81 For, as we have seen, evidence of lie detector tests is generally excluded
even though there is expert testimony Introduced as to the construction,
theory, operation and accuracy of the device. See supra, note 24. Accord-
ingly, referring to the three aspects of the problem stated at the outset of
this paper, we can definitely state In regard to the first and second that all
courts will receive evidence of speed as shown by a radar speedmeter if
expert testimony has been given as to the construction, theory, operation
and accuracy of the device, and that some courts will admit evidence of
speedmeter readings without requiring such expert testimony. As to the
third aspect of the problem, namely, what weight or value is to be accorded
the data revealed by the speedmeter, it is self evident that in these criminal
prosecutions for violating speed laws a jury verdict of not guilty, even
though in the face of evidence of radar speedmeter readings establishing
guilt, would not be set aside. This is the inherent nature of our criminal
procedure. The only way in which the court would be called upon to con-
sider a radar speedmeter reading as having such conclusive force that a
jury verdict of guilty would be set aside, as was done in the Maine and New
York paternity cases (see supra, notes 50 and 51), would be for the state to
prosecute the accused for violating the speed limit on the basis of testimony
of an observer not using a meter, and for the accused to introduce evidence
that a radar speedmeter reading made of the speed of his car at the time
In question showed he was not violating the speed limit. From the very
nature of events this situation is most unlikely to occur.
11 People v. City of Buffalo v. Beck, 205 Misc. 757, ... , 130 N. Y. S. 2d 354,
357 (Sup. Ct. 1954). (Italics supplied.)
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing as their own the language of the trial judges which they
now find premature. Until that day has arrived, however,
the careful law enforcement officer who would be certain of
sustaining a conviction based on radar evidence of speed,
would be well advised to have an electronics expert in court
to prove the construction, theory, operation and accuracy
of the radar speedmeter used in the particular case.90
In both the Off ermai0 1 and Dantonio2 cases the court
suggested that expert testimony could be dispensed with
if the legislature by statute would provide that a reading
on a radar speedmeter, which has been certified as accurate
by the authority designated by the legislature, is to be ad-
mitted as prima facie evidence of the speed of the vehicle
driven by the accused. While such legislation would cer-
tainly relieve the courts of responsibility, it appears to the
writer that if the courts properly perform their function,
said legislation is no more needed in the case of radar speed-
meters than in the case of x-rays.
It is submitted that there is now more than adequate
knowledge of the operation and accuracy of radar speed-
meters in the area of science to which these devices belong
to warrant their being accorded judicial recognition with-
out the aid of expert testimony or legislative direction. No
longer need the judge be in ignorance of the theory and
operation of these devices. Such scientific papers as that
of Dr. Kopper which appears in this Law Review should be
of material aid to the courts in determining the position
that the speedmeter has in the scientific fields to which it
belongs.
To require the production of an expert in electronics
at every trial involving the use of radar evidence is to delay
10 Whenever the results obtained through the use of a new scientific device
or process are offered in evidence, the court at first may and frequently
should require expert testimony. Later, as case after case has been tried
and the results of the device or process have repeatedly been introduced
following the explanation of the expert, the courts will take judicial notice
of the accuracy of the scientific device or process in question, and it is then
no longer necessary to produce the expert. Until, however, a particular
appellate court has said it will judicially notice the particular scientific
device or process counsel cannot safely proceed without the expert.
91 People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
2 State v. Dantonio, 31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
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justice, create unnecessary expense and ignore the admitted
progress of science. A court so doing may well find itself in
the very unenviable position of the Supreme Court of South
Dakota when,98 in 1936, as we have heretofore seen, it was
compelled to declare the complete reverse of its "unen-
lightened" decision of 1933 in which it had refused to recog-
nize judicially the efficacy of blood grouping tests. Let us
hope that at this late date in the use of radar speedmeters
no court will be so "unenlightened" as to lay the foundation
for the duplication of such an unfortunate experience!*
s State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 266 N. W. 667 (1936), discussed supra,
p. 367.
* [Editorial comment: Subsequent to the publication of the above sym-
posium in the North Carolina Law Review, the Dantonio case, discussed
by Mr. Baer, (circa, fns. 1, 13, 27a, 80, 85, 92), was appealed to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, State v. Dantonio, 18 N. J. 570, 115 A. 2d 35 (1955).
The Court quoted the above article with approval and affirmed the decision
of the Appellate Division of New Jersey, concluding that like X-ray
machines, cardiographs, fingerprints, and similar scientific devices, radar
speedmeters have become established as accurate scientific devices and
properly should be received in evidence upon a showing that the radar device
was properly set up and tested by police officers "without any need for
independent expert testimony by electrical engineers as to its general nature
and trustworthiness" (p. 40). The later Dantonio case was noted in 10
Rutgers L. Rev. 454 (1955).
Compare In Re Beamer, 283 P. 2d 356 (1955), where the District Court
of Appeal of California (First Dist.) denied a writ of habeas corpus to a
petitioner convicted of speeding largely on evidence obtained by a radar
speedmeter. Petitioner claimed that such evidence violated Section 751 of
the California Vehicle Code prohibiting admissibility of evidence obtained
through the use of a "speed trap". The Court held that a radar speedmeter
device is not a "speed trap" as defined by the Code, and by dictum men-
tioned that such evidence obtained by the use of radar devices when coupled
with expert testimony on the subject, has been held admissible in the few
jurisdictions that have decided the question. This case was noted in 43
Calif. L. Rev. 710 (1955).
For recent discussions in periodical literature since the above symposium
was published, see Admissibility of Radar Evidence - Need for Legislation,
5 Am. U. Intra. L. Rev. 1 (1955) ; Adams, Radar - Black Magic To Catch
Speeders, 9 Wyo. L. J. 122 (1955) ; Carosell and Coombs, Radar Evidence
in the Courts, 32 Dicta 323 (1955).]
